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1. Introduction 
After World War II, the Japanese economy as well as many others was affected strongly by U.S. 
business cycles. This relationship has been expressed as “When U.S. sneezes, Japan catches cold.” 
But recently there has been a lot of talk on business cycle decoupling between U.S and other 
developed countries (IMF 2007). That is, spillover effects of U.S. business cycles are said to have 
weakened. As of now, U.S. has suffered from the collapse of residential price bubbles, the resulting 
fall of profits in financial and other corporate firms and expected serious recession ahead. If U.S. and 
Japanese business cycles are decoupling it is likely that U.S. recession doesn’t have much impact on 
Japan. 
It has been also pointed out that the impact of exchange rate changes on the real economy has 
declined. The impact depends not only on the responsiveness of export and import volumes to 
relative price changes between domestic goods and foreign goods, but also on the responsiveness of 
import prices to exchange rate changes. If the responsiveness of import prices to exchange rate 
changes is small, both the relative price levels and volumes of export and import do not change 
much. Then there will be little expenditure switching effect with respect to real exchange rates. In 
fact, Campa and Goldberg (2002) reported that the responsiveness of import price to exchange rate 
changes is falling among OECD countries. If the impact of exchange rate changes on the real 
economy has declined, the yen appreciation doesn’t worsen her real economy much. Again, in fact, 
Otani, Shiratsuka and Shirota (2003) and Miyao (2003) showed the decline of impact of exchange 
rate changes in Japan. 
This paper examines the impact of such global shocks as foreign business cycles and exchange 
rate changes on the Japanese economy by using a VAR model. Our empirical model includes both 
spillover (expenditure changing) effects of foreign GDP and relative price (expenditure switching) 
effects of exchange rates. Thus we can analyze the relative price effect of exogenous yen 
appreciation1 separately from the spillover effects of exogenous global as well as foreign recessions.  
This paper has two objectives. First, we examine whether we can detect structural changes in the 
                                                  
1 Depreciation could have positive effects on inflation and/or business cycles. When the Bank of 
Japan decreased nominal interest rates to zero in the latter half of the 1990s, real interest rates did 
not fell due to deflation. Then Krugman (1998) suggested inflation targetting because inflation could 
reduce real interest rates. Svensson (2001) focused on exchange rate policy for inflation, and 
suggested yen depreciation policy that aims at inflation targeting and temporal yen peg 
simultaneously. 
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transmission mechanism of these global shocks in the Japanese economy during the recent period. In 
particular, we analyze whether we can find evidence of business cycle decoupling between foreign 
economies and Japan and also we analyze whether we can find evidence of the reduced impact of 
exchange rate changes on the real economy. Second, we examine the relative effects of foreign 
business cycles across such regions as U.S., Europe and East Asia. We are interested in whether 
there are changes in relative contribution among regional business cycles to the Japanese economy in 
the recent period, particularly through deepening market integration in the regions. 
We have four main findings. First, the impact of global and external business cycles on the 
Japanese economy has witnessed some structural changes in the past three decades. But it is NOT 
decoupling, but re-coupling, namely, while we cannot detect strong evidence for spillover effects of 
external business cycles on Japan in the 1980s, we have significant positive spillovers in the most 
recent decade, i.e. the 2000s.   
Second, parallel with structural changes in global business cycle spillovers, their impacts both 
from US and Europe have been actually strengthened in the most recent period. Note, however, we 
find that they were already significant in the case of Europe in the 1980s, but this is not that clear in 
the case of US, somewhat puzzlingly. Most interesting finding here is that East Asia has started to 
show very significant positive spillover effects of business cycles on Japan in the 2000s, in contrast 
to the 1980s and early 1990s with almost no spillovers.  
Third, the impact of expenditure switching through exogenous exchange rate changes on the real 
economy has also appeared to witness structural changes in the past three decades. In fact, we 
ensured the reduced pass-through which has been often discussed by now. Namely, although we can 
see some significant expenditure switching effects of exogenous changes in real exchange rates in 
the 1980s, we found that they have become very insignificant particularly since the mid-1990s. In 
other words, we detect structural changes in the transmission mechanism of such global shocks as 
business cycles and relative prices, the former of which becoming significant and the latter 
insignificant.  
Fourth, the impacts of exogenous business cycles and relative price changes on domestic inflation 
demonstrate again asymmetric structural changes over time. External business cycles have begun to 
have positive impacts on inflation, while real exchange rate changes become insignificant in 
affecting negatively on inflation. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the literatures of business 
cycles among countries and exchange rate pass-through. Section 3 describes empirical model and 
data for the empirical exercise and shows the results of estimation in section 4. Section 5 and 6 
analyzes time variation of the effects of global shock and regional effects respectively. Section 7 
analyzes the magnitude of effects using variance decomposition. Section 8 is robustness analysis. 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
We deal with two types of global shocks in this paper. The first shock is business cycles in foreign 
countries. A business cycle has an international spillover effect through trade channels. IMF (2007) 
analyzes by using VAR whether U.S. and European recessions have effects upon Latin America and 
whether U.S. and Japanese recessions upon East Asia. Recessions in U.S. and Europe negatively 
affect Latin America, where the effect of U.S. being stronger than that of Europe, while U.S. and 
Japanese recessions affecting East Asia as well. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) investigated the 
determinants of business cycle linkages. Bilateral trade, geographical distance between countries, 
and being both developed countries or both developing countries, are important for a business cycle 
linkage, but industrial structure and membership of a currency union are not important factors. IMF 
(2007), Stock and Watson (2005) and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) pointed out the importance of 
common international shocks for a business cycle linkage. The business cycle linkage between U.S. 
and other foreign countries depend on the magnitude of common international shocks such as an oil 
shock, while the idiosyncratic shocks in foreign countries have spillover effects weaker than 
common international shocks (IMF 2007). 
Stock and Watson (2005) and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) pointed out that, compared to the 
1960s and 1970s, business cycles in G7 countries were not linked to each other in the 1980s and 
1990s due to a reduced magnitude of common international shocks, but that the spillover effects of 
domestic shocks have been intensified by trade expansion and financial development. Also, Stock 
and Watson (2005) reported that a decline of business cycle linkages within G7 countries in the 
1980s and 1990s was due to a reduction of common international shocks except for Japan, and due 
to a structural change in transmission mechanism of shocks in the case of Japan. That is, they 
suggest that Japanese business cycles were dominated more by domestic shocks and regional shocks 
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than by international shocks. By analyzing business cycle linkages among U.S., Japan, China and 
other East Asian countries McKinnon and Günther (2003) reported that Japanese business cycles 
strongly affect East Asian countries. 
The second type of shock we focus on is exchange rate changes. Various factors such as business 
fluctuations and policy changes can affect exchange rates. Above all, changes of international 
investors’ perceptions and sentiments affect international capital flows and thus exchange rates. 
Exchange rates as a relative price between two currencies affect trade volumes. Through the 
expenditure switching effect currency depreciation is expected to give a boost to a domestic 
economy.  
This effect of exchange rate changes, however, depends on the degree of exchange rate 
pass-through. If exchange rate change affects import prices one-to-one (pass-through is perfect), the 
effect is strong. Conversely, if exchange rate changes affect import prices only partially 
(pass-through is imperfect or partial), the effect is weaker because exchange rate changes do not 
affect relative prices much. Recent researches revealed that exchange rate pass-through in advanced 
economies tended to decline2. Campa and Goldberg (2002) reported that exchange rate pass-through 
declined in 15 of 25 OECD countries after 1990s. In the case of Japan, Otani, Shiratsuka and Shirota 
(2003) showed that the pass-through declined in both macroeconomic and industrial levels. The 
decline of pass-through implies that the expenditure switching effect become less effective. In fact, 
Miyao (2003) found that the yen fluctuation affected export and import volumes before the 
mid-1980s, but it did not afterwards. It suggests that in Japan the impact of exchange rate changes on 
the real economy declined probably because of structural changes in trade patterns occurred through 
the 1980s to 1990s3. 
 
3. Estimation Model and Data 
We use a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model for estimation. The variables we estimate 
are foreign gross domestic product (FGDP), Japanese yen real effective exchange rate (REER), 
                                                  
2 Campa and Goldberg (2005) surveyed recent studies on exchange rate pass-through. 
3 Kimura (2006) pointed out that international production and distribution networks are being 
formed in East Asia. After the Plaza agreement, Japanese corporations moved factories to East Asian 
countries and constructed a distribution network of parts, components and products. Partly because 
the significant part of international trade is intra-firm transactions, import prices tend not to reflect 
exchange rate fluctuations as before and the pass-through to import prices declined. 
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Japanese inflation rate (INFL), and. Japanese gross domestic product (GDP). The sample period is 
from 1980Q1 to 2007Q4. 
FGDP is a total GDP of 14 principal trade partners of Japan in 2005 calculated from Direction of 
Trade Statistics of IMF4, as GDP index (2000 year = 100) multiplied by real GDP in constant 2000 
US dollars. We obtained GDP index data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), and 
real GDP data in constant 2000 US dollars from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005. 
FGDP covers Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Netherland, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States5. Since 
there are no quarterly GDP data of China and Indonesia, of Malaysia before 1993 and of Thailand 
before 1990 in IFS, we generate quarterly GDP data from annual data from IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Databases. Japanese GDP is calculated as GDP index (year 2000 = 100) multiplied by real 
GDP in constant 2000 US dollars. INFL is the first difference of the logarithm of consumer price 
index. CPI and real effective exchange rates are obtained from the websites of Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications and the Bank of Japan, respectively. GDP, FGDP and INFL are 
seasonally adjusted. All variables are logarithm differences multiplied by 100. 
In order to check the stationarity of variables that we use in the model, we implemented the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. Lag numbers in ADF test is 
determined by AIC. Table 1 reports the results of ADF test and PP test. For the level variables, both 
tests reveal that for all variables the null hypotheses of presence of unit roots cannot be rejected at 5 
percent level. On the other hand, for the first differences both tests rejected the null hypotheses for 
all variables. Therefore, we interpreted those variables as being first order integrated I(1).  
 
＜Table 1 here＞ 
 
Moreover, in order to test if there is a cointegration vector in our model because all variables are 
I(1), we implemented the Engel-Granger test, the Johansen test and the Gregory-Hansen test. Table 2 
reports their results. All the tests couldn’t show that there is a cointegration vector in our model. 
                                                  
4 We obtained Japanese export data from Direction of Trade Statistics of IMF. The export share of 15 
countries with Taiwan amounted to 81% of the total. 
5 Although Taiwan is the fourth largest share in Japanese exports, it is not included in 
FGDP because her real GDP data in constant 2000 US dollars is not available in WDI. 
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Therefore, we will use first differenced VAR in the next section. 
 
＜Table 2 here＞ 
 
Based on Sims (1980) we impose a recursive constraint for identification of structural VAR. 
Then, the order of variables is important because higher order variables are assumed to affect lower 
order variables contemporaneously and lower order variables to affect higher order variables with 
lags. In our model, we assume a small country model that foreign variables are of higher order. 
Among domestic variables, we assume that GDP is most endogenous. Therefore, we adopted the 
order of FGDP, REER, INFL, and GDP. Lag numbers in the VAR model is determined by AIC. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section we will verify the validity of our model. For this purpose we focus on the responses 
of domestic variables to the shocks from foreign GDP and real effective exchange rate of yen. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative impulse responses of a VAR model with 4 variables. 
 
＜Figure 1 here＞ 
 
The first column of Figure 1 shows the responses of all variables to a FGDP (foreign output) 
shock. A positive foreign ouput shock causes real yen appreciation, domestic inflation to rise and 
domestic output (GDP) to increase. Thus, foreign business cycles have spillover effects to Japan. 
The second column of Figure 1 shows the responses to a yen real appreciation shock. Foreign 
GDP tends to increase, domestic inflation to fall and domestic GDP to decline, though the GDP 
response is not statistically significant. Thus, although the appreciation shock suppresses domestic 
inflation, possibly through declining import prices, we cannot detect a significant expenditure 
switching effect here. 
The third column shows the responses to a domestic inflation shock. Japanese inflation has no 
impact on foreign as well as domestic GDP and the real effective exchange rate appreciates slightly, 
but not in a statistically significant way. Thus, the domestic inflation shock does not affect the other 
variables. 
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The fourth column shows the responses to a Japanese GDP shock. Japanese GDP does not affect 
foreign GDP even in the long run. While an increase of Japanese GDP is often presumed to have 
spillover effects to foreign countries, we find no such effects.6 The real effective exchange rate does 
not respond to Japanese GDP shock, but domestic inflation rises significantly. 
We examined the estimated results of our 4-variable VAR model. The impacts of a foreign GDP 
shock as well as a real effective exchange rate shock on domestic variables are not only consistent 
with expected spillover effects and expenditure switching effects discussed in section 2, but also 
reasonably interpreted. Thus, we can safely use this VAR model in the following sections.  
 
5. Structural Changes 
In this section, we will examine possible structural changes in the transmission process of the 
global shocks. First, we divide the sample period into two subsample periods of 1980Q1-1993Q4 
and of 1994Q1-2007Q2. When we estimate VAR models, we implicitly assume no structural 
changes during the sample period. Even if there are structural changes, VAR models cannot catch 
such changes and estimate only an average effect over the whole sample period. Therefore, we use 
the same VAR model over subsample periods in order to detect possible structural changes in global 
linkages. 
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of domestic inflation and GDP to the foreign GDP shock 
(upper panel) and the real exchange rate shock (lower panel). The first column shows the results for 
the former subsample period of 1980Q1-93Q4 and the second column shows those for the latter 
subsample period of 1994Q1-2007Q2. 
 
＜Figure 2 here＞ 
 
As to the foreign GDP shock, it has no impact on domestic inflation in the former subperiod, but 
significantly positive impact in the latter subperiod. The foreign GDP shock has positive impact on 
domestic GDP in both subperiods, though statistically less significant in the latter subperiod. As to 
the yen real appreciation shock, it has strong negative impact on domestic inflation in both 
                                                  
6 Rather Figure 1 suggests a negative impact of the domestic GDP shock on FGDP, although being 
insignificant, which appears puzzling. 
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subperiods. But, the shock has significantly negative impact on domestic output only in the former 
subperiod, and no impact in the latter. 
In other words, according to the estimation results over the two subsample periods, we found that 
the foreign GDP shock has recently gained positive impact on domestic inflation, but that the yen 
appreciation shock has recently lost negative impact on domestic output. We did not detect structural 
changes in the positive impact of the foreign GDP shock on domestic output, nor in negative impact 
of the yen appreciation on domestic inflation.  
Next, we investigate a variation of impacts of global shocks in more detail by implementing 
rolling estimations over 19 ten-year subsample periods. Figure 3 reports the impulse responses of 
domestic inflation and output to the foreign GDP (upper panel) and real exchange rate shocks (lower 
panel). It shows only 3 representative results out of 19 in total. The first column is the results for the 
subsample period of 1980Q1-89Q4, the second column for 1990Q1-99Q4, and the third column for 
2000Q1-07Q2. 
 
＜Figure 3 here＞ 
  
 It is apparent that the magnitude and significance of the impact of the foreign GDP shocks vary 
across subsample periods. The foreign GDP shock has a positive impact on domestic output 
consistently in the 1980s and early 1990s, but not always significantly. But when including the years 
of 1997-99, domestic output show no response at all. After 1999, however, the foreign GDP shock 
regains a positive impact on domestic output. In particular, the estimation results that include the 
years of 2000-01 show significantly positive spillover effects, which is consistent with the assertion 
by Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) that common international shock occurred in the years of 2000-01 
and business cycles in G7 are linked together. We must note, however, that the positive impact of the 
foreign output on domestic output is not coherent across subsample periods. The positive spillover 
can be found only for the recent subsample periods, which is not always significant, though. 
The magnitude and significance of the impact of yen appreciation shock also vary across 
subsample periods and the estimation results are different from those with the two subsample periods. 
In the analysis with the two subsample periods, the appreciation shock has negative impact on 
domestic inflation in both subsample periods. But under the rolling estimation analysis, the impact of 
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the appreciation shock on inflation tends to lose significance as time passes and almost disappear in 
the 2000s. On the other hand, although the yen appreciation shock had consistently negative but 
weak impact on domestic output in the 1980s and early 1990s, it appears to lose impact on domestic 
output in the 2000s.  
Weakening impacts of the exchange rate shock on domestic variables is consistent with the 
declining exchange rate pass-through to import prices since the 1990s. As stated above, the smaller 
pass-through implies that exchange rate changes affect the relative price level less so that the 
expenditure switching effect doesn’t work well. The less export and import volumes respond to 
exchange rate changes, the less domestic output responds to them as well. Also, the declining 
exchange rate pass-through to import prices means declining pass-through to consumer prices7. The 
less import prices respond to exchange rate changes, the less domestic inflation respond to them as 
well8 . These results of ours are consistent with the findings on the declining exchange rate 
pass-through by Campa and Goldberg (2002) and Otani, Shiratsuka and Shirota (2003) and with the 
finding on the weakening expenditure switching effect by Miyao (2003). 
 
6. Regional Effects 
In this section, we will analyze the spillover effects of regional output shocks by estimating the 
same VAR model where foreign GDP is divided into three regions, i.e. U.S. (US), Europe (EU) and 
East Asia (EA). Considering possible structural changes, the model is estimated over the two sub 
sample periods as well as the rolling 10-year subsample periods9.  
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of domestic inflation and output to regional output shocks 
                                                  
7 Generally, exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices tends to be smaller than that to import 
prices. Import goods constitute only part of consumer goods, and transport costs and wages through 
distribution channels are added to import goods before final sales. 
8 Taylor (2000) pointed out that exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices declined because 
inflation was low and steady all over the world in the 1990s. Low inflation reduces a room of price 
changes by exporters because competitive goods prices are fixed due to more intense competition 
among firms. So they cannot pass through exchange rate changes to goods prices.  
9 Before estimation, we tested stationarity of U.S., EU and EA GDP variables and cointegration in 
the model. Unit root tests reveal that the level variables do not reject the null hypothesis of presence 
of unit roots at the 5 percent level and the first difference variables reject the null. Therefore, we 
interpreted those variables as first order integrated I(1). Also, the models with US and EU GDP 
rejected the null of cointegration vector. But, as to the model with EA GDP, while the Johansen test 
rejected the null, other two tests didn’t reject it. Therefore, we estimate models by using differenced 
VAR here. 
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over rolling 10-year subsample periods. Only three out of 19 periods are illustrated. The first column 
is for the period of 1980Q1-89Q4, the second column for 1990Q1-99Q4, and the third for 
2000Q1-07Q2. 
 
＜Figure 4 here＞ 
 
Figure 4 suggests that the impulse responses to U.S. and Europe shocks are similar to those to the 
global output shock in Figure 3. Namely the spillover effects were positive in the 1980s and early 
1990s and disappeared when included the period of 1997-99 and significantly positive again in the 
2000s. And then, more precisely, while the spillover effects of Europe were statistically significant in 
the 1980s, earlier 1990s and 2000s, those of U.S. were significant only in the 2000s. Thus, we can 
sum up that the business cycles of U.S. and Europe have stronger positive spillover effects to Japan 
in the 2000s. 
The impulse response of domestic output to an East Asia GDP shock differs from those to U.S. 
and Europe shocks. East Asia has no spillover effect on Japan in the 1980s and earlier 1990s but has 
significantly positive effect in the later 1990s and 2000s. Thus, we find that the Japanese business 
cycles have become linked to East Asia more than before since the mid 1990s. 
There are two possible reasons for those structural changes. First, the trade structure changed in 
Japan. In fact, Kimura (2006) pointed out that trade between Japan and East Asia grew rapidly 
through the establishment of international production and distribution networks. We presume that 
this changing regional trade structure intensifies a business cycle linkage between Japan and East 
Asia.  
  Another reason is simply the rapid economic growth in East Asia. During the years of 1985-2003, 
while U.S. and Europe became 1.7 times and 1.5 times larger in terms of constant 2000 US dollar, 
respectively, East Asia became 3.5 times larger in size10. As a result of this rapid economic growth, 
East Asia has become a principal export market to Japan and East Asian business cycles have had 
significant positive spillover effects on Japan in the 2000s. 
While Stock and Watson (2005) pointed out that Japan was de-linked to other G7 countries in the 
1990s due to a change of her transmission mechanism to shocks, our results implies that Japan has 
                                                  
10 We used the data for 2003 that is available and latest in WDI. 
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been linked to East Asia since the latter half of the 1990s. 
Note that the impulse responses of domestic inflation are different across regions. Figure 4 shows 
that, while shocks in U.S., Europe and East Asia didn’t have positive impacts on inflation in the 
earlier period, they affect inflation in the later period11. Thus it implies that business cycles in those 
regions have come to affect Japanese inflation. Furthermore, the results of rolling VAR estimation 
reveal that the impact of U.S. shock on inflation appeared in the later 1990s and that of East Asia 
appeared in the 1990s, but then the former disappeared in the 2000s. On the other hand, Europena 
shock had positive impact on inflation in the 1990s only. Thus we can say that foreign business 
cycles, particularly East Asia, have positive impacts on domestic inflation in the 2000s. Again, we 
verified that the impacts of foreign business cycles effects differ by region and vary over time. 
 
7. Variance Decomposition 
 So far, we analyzed the direction and significance of the effects of foreign business cycles and 
exchange rate shocks on Japanese inflation and output. In this section, using variance decomposition 
we analyze the relative magnitude of its effects in their total variances. 
 Figure 5 shows variance decompositions of inflation and GDP to REER shock in rolling VAR. We 
used the value after 10 quarters from shocks occurred.  
 
＜Figure 5 here＞ 
 
Figure 5 suggests that the relative magnitudes of exchange rate shocks on inflation and GDP has a 
declining trend though varying across sample periods,. The magnitudes on inflation are an average 
of 30% in former of 1980s, declined to about 20% in the latter of the 1980s and the 1990s. Moreover, 
in the 2000s those are below 10%. The magnitudes on GDP are an average of 20% in the 1980s, 
temporary rose to about 30% because excessive appreciation of yen rate in 1995 depressed real 
economy. Thereafter, though the magnitudes are over 10% in the latter of the 1990s, those are below 
10% in the 2000s. Therefore, it is apparent that the effect of exchange rate on real economy has 
declined in its relative magnitude. 
Figure 6 shows variance decomposition of GDP to FGDP and regional shock in rolling VAR. 
                                                  
11 The impact of European output shock was not significant. 
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Similarly to Figure 5, we used the value of 10 quarters from shocks occurred. 
 
＜Figure 6 here＞ 
 
 Figure 6 illustrates that the relative contribution of FGDP shock on domestic GDP volatility varies 
largely and there are two humps the former of which is in midst of 1980s and the latter in the late of 
1990s. Particularly, the second hump imply that the spillover effect from foreign output has risen 
lately. The contribution of East Asia rises in the latter half of the 1990s. It appears that the Japanese 
economy has been affected almost equally by the three regions recently. 
 
8. Robustness Check 
In this section, we will report the results of robustness checks on our basic 4-variable VAR model. 
First, we estimate two VAR models with 5 variables including money supply (M2CD) and 
government expenditure (GOV) respectively. The results are similar to those of the 4 variable VAR 
models. 
Since different ordering of variables might generate different results, next, we test alternative 
orderings. First, we assume inflation as the most endogenous variable, i.e. as (FGDP, REER, GDP, 
INFL), second, real effective exchange rate as the most exogenous as (REER, FGDP, INFL, GDP) 
and third, we replace domestic output and foreign output as (REER, GDP, FGDP, INFL). The results 
from these different orderings turned out to be similar to those of the original ordering. 
Finally, we estimate two additional VAR models in order to incorporate the third country effects. 
First, we estimate a model with 5 variables including both U.S. and non-U.S. FGDP, i.e. as (US, 
nonUS-FGDP, REER, INFL, GDP), and, second, a model with 4 variables including all regional 
GDPs as (US, EU, EA, GDP). The results of these models are again similar to those of the original 
basic model. Thus, we confirmed the robustness of our basic results obtained so far. 
 
9. Conclusion 
We examined the effects of both foreign output shock and exchange rate shocks on Japanese  
domestic output and inflation by using a VAR model. Our empirical analysis reveals several 
interesting points.  
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First, while the Japan’s linkage to global, U.S. and European business cycles seems to have 
disappeared in the 1990s, these business cycles are, in fact, confirmed to have strong positive 
spillover effects on Japan in the 2000s. The linkage might have declined because there were 
relatively less common international shocks during the 1990s. In particular, Japan was affected not 
by U.S. and European cycles but by domestic shocks and regional shocks in East Asia then. But, 
actually in the recent period or the 2000s, business cycles in U.S. and Europe generate significantly 
positive spillovers on Japanese output, implying that there is no such thing as decoupling at least 
recently in the case of Japan. Considering increasing integration through both product and capital 
markets, it is very likely that we will have more common international shocks and that business 
cycle linkages among countries will be more intensified, generating larger spillover effects of global 
shocks. 
Second, East Asia has become far more important than before for Japanese business cycles. 
Business cycles in East Asia had little impact on Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s, but have had 
strong positive spillover effects since the mid 1990s. At least one of the basic reasons is the 
remarkably intensified linkage between Japan and East Asia through rapid and deep product market 
integration. We must note here that such strengthened business cycle linkage increases the 
importance of the third country effect, which is very relevant in discussing the impacts of the current 
U.S. recession. Business cycle linkage between U.S. and Europe is stronger than that with Japan on 
one hand, and East Asian exports depend on U.S., Europe and Japan in addition to their 
intra-regional trade on the other. In particular, Chinese exports depend heavily on U.S. If U.S. 
recession spillovers to Europe and East Asia, the impact of U.S. recession on Japan will be stronger 
because the main final markets for Japan will slow down. Thus, considering such third country 
effects through Europe and East Asia, it is very likely that the U.S. recession have serious negative 
spillover effects on Japan. 
Third, the effects of exchange rate changes on real economy have declined, mainly because of 
declining exchange rate pass-through to import prices and ultimately to consumer prices in the recent 
period. Yen appreciation caused domestic output slowdown and disinflation in consumer prices in 
the 1980s. But such expenditure switching effects of exchange rate changes have become less 
powerful in the 1990s and worked no more towards the 2000s. This implies that depreciation does 
not lead to demand recovery, nor appreciation to slowdown. In other words, exchange rate 
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management, if ever, cannot be used for stabilization purposes. Even if the Bank of Japan could 
depreciate yen exchange rate, it would need very large depreciation for Japan’s recovery, which may 
not be acceptable for political economic reasons.  
Finally, the positive impact of foreign business cycles on domestic inflation has become 
significant in the 2000s. Foreign business cycles used to have little impact on domestic inflation in 
the 1980s, but especially those of East Asia have had positive effects since the 1990s. Note that this 
is additional spillover effects on Japan. 
We have shown that Japanese business cycles have become more affected by foreign shocks and 
that exchange rate changes have lost adjustment abilities in the 2000s. This implies that the Japanese 
policy authorities have had to face with more uncontrollable shocks coming from abroad, without 
the help of external adjustment through exchange rate changes. In particular, foreign business cycles 
not only in U.S. and Europe but also in East Asia have come to affect Japan and, moreover, their 
effects spillover to domestic inflation as well as output.  
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Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
    ADF  PP  
Level       
  GDP －1.64     －1.21     
  FGDP －2.28     －2.24     
  REER －0.85     －1.13     
  CPI －0.90     －2.31     
First difference         
  ⊿GDP －3.44**  －9.04***  
  ⊿FGDP －6.23***  －6.33***  
  ⊿REER －8.99***  －9.12***  
  ⊿CPI －3.52***  －7.61***  
This table reports the results of a unit root test. ADF denotes 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and PP denotes Phillips-Perron 
test. The tests include constant term and trend in level and only 
constant term in first difference. *, **, *** denote respectively 
that the hypothesis that the variable contain unit root can be 
rejected at 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance. 
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Table 2: Cointegration Tests 
    EG  JOH  GH   
(FGDP, REER, INFL, GDP) -2.51   25.64   -3.63    
 
This table reports results of cointegration tests in our VAR model with FGDP, REER, INFL 
and GDP. EG denotes Engel-Granger test, JOH denotes Johansen maximum eigenvalue test 
and GH denotes Gregory-Hansen test. The tests include 4 lags. *, ** denote respectively that 
the hypothesis that there are cointegration vector in the model can be rejected at 5%, 1%. We 
used critical value in MacKinnon (1991) for EG test, in Osterwald-Lenum (1992) for JOH 
test and in Gregory-Hansen (1996) for GH test as follows. 
 
Critical Values 5% 1%
EG -4.21 -4.83
JOH 27.07 32.24
GH -5.28 -5.77
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 Figure 1: Impulse Responses over the Full Sample Period 
(Variables: FGDP, REER, INFL, GDP) 
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This figure shows impulse responses of VAR model with 4 variables. The left column shows impulse 
responses of each variable to FGDP shock, the second column shows impulse responses to REER shock, 
the third column shows impulse responses to INFL shock, the right column shows impulse responses to 
domestic GDP shock. Dotted lines are confidence bands of 2 standard deviations.  
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses over the Two Subsample Periods 
(Variables: FGDP, REER, INFL, GDP) 
A. FGDP shock 
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B. REER shock 
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This figure shows impulse response of INFL and GDP to FGDP shock and 
REER shock in sub samples analysis. The left column shows the results in 
80Q1-93Q4, the right column shows the results in 94Q1-07Q2. Dotted lines are 
confidence bands of 2 standard deviations. 
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses in Rolling VAR 
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B. REER shock 
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This figure shows impulse response of INFL and GDP to FGDP shock and REER shock in rolling VAR. We 
show representative 3 out of 19 results in rolling VAR. The left column shows results with 80Q1-89Q4, the 
center shows results with 90Q1-99Q4, the right shows results with 00Q1-07Q2. Dotted lines are confidence 
bands of 2 standard deviations. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses by Region in Rolling VAR 
A. GDP shock in U.S. 
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B. GDP shock in Europe 
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This figure shows impulse response of INFL and GDP to GDP shock in U.S., Europe and East Asia in rolling 
VAR. We show representative 3 out of 19 results in rolling VAR. The left column shows results with 
80Q1-89Q4, the center shows results with 90Q1-99Q4, the right shows results with 00Q1-07Q2. Dotted lines 
are confidence bands of 2 standard deviations. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses by Region in Rolling VAR 
C. GDP shock in East Asia 
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This figure shows impulse response of INFL and GDP to GDP shock in U.S., Europe and East Asia in rolling 
VAR. We show representative 3 out of 19 results in rolling VAR. The left column shows results with 
80Q1-89Q4, the center shows results with 90Q1-99Q4, the right shows results with 00Q1-07Q2. Dotted lines 
are confidence bands of 2 standard deviations. 
 
 
 24
Figure 5: Variance Decomposition to REER shock in Rolling VAR 
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This figure shows variance decomposition of INFL and GDP to REER shock in rolling VAR as a percentage 
share of the total variance. We used values at 10 quarters after shocks. A horizontal axis shows start year of 
sample periods in Rolling VAR.  
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Figure 6: Variance Decomposition of GDP to foreign GDP shocks in Rolling VAR 
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This figure shows variance decomposition of GDP to FGDP and regional shock in rolling VAR as a percentage 
share of the total variance. We used values at 10 quarters after shocks. A horizontal axis shows start year of 
sample periods in Rolling VAR. 
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